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The thesis defended below is that the 
arguments associated with many common 
uses of analogy in reasoning have a sim-
ple, valid deductive structure. These uses 
of analogy are not properly accommodated 
by accounts of analogy in which the 
associated arguments have an inductive 
(Mill 1889), abductive (Peirce 1960), or 
eductive (W.E. Johnson 1964) structure. In 
this discussion I will stress the distinction 
between the activity of arguing and the 
passive entity which is the associated argu-
ment. For several of the examples discuss-
ed below we shall find analogies "in" argu-
ings but not "in" their associated argument. 
This should not be surprising. Often, 
analogical reasoning is indirect reasoning. 
It is similar to ironic reasoning. If someone 
announces a premise ironically, it would be 
a mistake to say that irony did not play a 
role in the reasoning, but the irony will not 
show up in the associated argument. 
1. Analogical arguings 
Arguings are activities involving an 
arguer and an audience: the arguer uses 
claims to persuade the audience to accept 
a claim. With any arguing there is an 
associated argument consisting of an n-tuple 
of sentences or sets of sentences. Arguings 
are fundamental; arguments are parasitic on 
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arguings. The arguments extrapolated from 
arguings are passive "things." If I try to 
convince you that it is cold by pointing to 
the thermometer, I am arguing. From this 
arguing we can extract the passive argu-
ment, the ordered pair < {T} , C), where T 
is the claim, say, that it is 5 below, and C 
is the claim that it is cold. (For more discus-
sion of this terminology and subsidiary no-
tions, see (F. Johnson 1980) and (F. 
Johnson 1984).) 
An analogy is a claim that certain things 
are like certain other things (whether or not 
the former things belong to the same class 
as the latter, that is, whether the analogy 
is literal or figurative). If an analogy, x is 
like y, is used in an arguing then x is the 
base (source, phoros) and y is the target 
(theme), or vice-versa. (The arguer expects 
his or her audience to be more familiar with 
the base than with the target.) An analogical 
arguing is an arguing in which an analogy 
plays an essential role. And an argument 
is an associated analogical argument if it is 
associated with an analogical arguing. 
1.1 He analogical arguings. No one will 
deny that the following example is an analog-
ical arguing; the debate concerns its analysis. 
Example L 
The famous chemist and biologist, Justus 
von Liebig, dismissed the germ theory with 
a shrug of his shoulders, regarding Pasteur's 
view that microbes could cailse fermentation 
as ridiculous and naive as the opinion of a 
child "who would explain the rapidity of the 
Rhine current by attributing it to the violent 
movement of the many millwheels at Maintz. " 
(Exercise from Copi 1986, p. 401) 
There are three steps in Liebig's arguing, 
which is a paradigm case of an analogical 
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arguing with a hidden conditional, an HC 
analogical arguing. 
Structure of an HC analogical arguing 
Step 1. (Analogy Step) The author thinks 
there is an analogy between B, the 
base, and T, the target. (In Exam-
ple 1 the relationship between the 
movement of the millwheels at 
Maintz and the movement of the 
Rhine is the base of the analogy and 
the relationship between the move-
ment of certain microbes and a cer-
tain fermentation process is the 
target of the analogy.) 
Step 2. (Analogy-to-Conditional-Step) The 
author expects the audience to 
recognize that by using the analogy 
in Step 1 he or she is asserting a 
conditional sentence with the 
following form: 'If T, or some por-
tion of T, has, or does not have, 
some feature F, then .... (In Ex-
ample L the conditional sentence 
is 'If microbes are the cause of the 
fermentation process then effects 
are causes. ') 
Step 3. (Inference Step) The author expects 
us to draw the conclusion (C) from 
the conditional sentence (major 
premise, Mp) in Step 2 by sup-
plementing the conditional with the 
denial of this conditional's conse-
quent (minor premise, mp). The 
associated argument is < {Mp, 
mp}, C> argument. (For Example 
L the associated argument is: < {If 
microbes are the cause of fermenta-
tion then effects are causes, Effects 
are not causes}, Microbes do not 
cause fermentation), an instance of 
modus tollendo tollens.) 
Perhaps the most sensitive spot in this 
analysis involves the relationship between 
the first and second steps. There is a temp-
tation to complicate the analysis of the 
associated argument by making room for 
a claim about the base of the analogy which 
gives evidence for (induces? abduces?) the 
conditional sentence. I resist this temptation. 
According to the HC analysis the analogy 
is a means of presenting the major premise 
of the associated argument, but is not itself 
a premise of the associated argument. 
This is another argument of an H C 
arguing: 
Example R 
This [further official statement] explained 
that The Satanic Verses had been banned as 
a pre-emptive measure. Certain passages 
had been identified as susceptible to distor-
tion and misuse, presumably by 
unscrupulous religious fanatics and such. 
The banning order had been issued to pre-
vent this misuse .... This really is astound-
ing. It is as though, having identified an in-
nocent person as a likely target for assault 
by muggers or rapists, you were to put that 
person in jail for protection. This is no way, 
Mr. Gandhi, for a free society to behave. 
(Salman Rushdie, Rocky Mountain News, 
Feb. 27, 1989, p. 41) 
The HC analogical arguing in Example R 
consists of the following steps: 
Step 1. (Analogy Step) Rushdie thinks The 
Satanic Verses (the target) is like an 
innocent person who is a likely vic-
tim of muggers or rapists (the base). 
Step 2. (Analogy-to-Conditional-Step) 
Rushdie thinks that by using the 
analogy in Step 1 we will recognize 
the truth of this conditional: 'If it 
is right to ban The Satanic Verses 
then the possible misuse of 
something by someone provides 
sufficient justification for isolating 
this thing. ' 
Step 3. (Inference Step) Rushdie thinks 
that we will infer the denial of the 
antecedent of the conditional in 
Step 1 (the conclusion) from this 
conditional together with the denial 
of its consquent. 
The associated argument in Rushdie' s 
analogical arguing is: 
1. (Major premise) If it is right to ban The 
Satanic Verses then the possible misuse 
of something by someone is sufficient 
justification for isolating this thing. 
2. (Minor premise) The possible misuse of 
something by someone does not per se 
justify the isolation of this thing. 
3. (Conclusion) It is not right to ban The 
Satanic Verses. 
1.2 Inductive analogical arguings. 
Jevons presents what I think of as being the 
common analysis of analogical arguments. 
He says: 
Argument from analogy may be defined as 
direct inductive inference from one instance 
to any similar instance. It may, as Mr. Mill 
says, be reduced to the following for-
mula:-'Two things resemble each other in 
one or more respects; a certain proposition 
is true of the one; therefore it is true of the 
other.' (Jevons 1957, p. 227) 
Jevons is talking about what we shall call 
a simple inductive analogical arguing, con-
sisting of the following steps: 
Step 1. (Analogy Step) The author thinks 
that base B is like target T in 
virtue of sharing properties PI, 
P2, •••• 
Step 2. (Base Step) The author thinks that 
base B has property Q, not includ-
ed among the Pi'S. 
Step 3. (Target Step) The author expects 
the audience to infer that T has Q, 
given the propositions embedded in 
Steps 1 and 2. 
The associated argument in a simple induc-
tive analogical arguing is the ordered pair 
({B and T share properties PI, .... (Mp), 
B has Q (mp)}, T has Q (conclusion». 
Of course, we cannot be sure that Jevons 
would view Examples Land R as simple 
inductive analogical arguings. But, given 
the context in which Example L is cited in 
(Copi 1986), we can be quite sure that Copi 
thinks that this is the associated argument: 
1. (Major premise) The relationship 
of the movement of the millwheels 
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(mm) to the movement of the Rhine 
(mr) is like the relationship of 
microbes (m) to fermentation (t). 
2. (Minor premise) mm is not a cause 
of mr. 
So, 3. (Conclusion) m is not a cause of f. 
Given this identification of the argument 
in Example L, we are drawn into such ques-
tions as whether dissimilarities involving the 
large number of microbes involved in the 
fermentation process and the small number 
of millwheels at Maintz involved in the 
Rhine's current affect the value of the argu-
ment. Is the dissimilarity relevant? What 
other dissimilarities are there? What other 
similarities are there? To focus on these 
questions is to fail to appreciate Liebig's 
reasoning. 
Similar thoughts apply to Example R. 
According to those who view it as a sim-
ple inductive analogical arguing the 
associated argument is: 
1. (Major premise) The Satanic 
Verses (the target) and an innocent 
person (the base) share properties 
PI, .... (have an identity?, have 
intrinsic value? ... ) 
2. (Minor premise) An innocent per-
son (the base) should be allowed 
to circulate freely. 
So, 3. (Conclusion) The Satanic Verses 
(the target) should be allowed to 
circulate freely. 
But this analysis seems misguided. The 
criticism of Rushdie' s argument should not 
focus on similarities and dissimilarities be-
tween Rushdie' s book and innocent persons 
who are targets for muggers or rapists. Does 
the fact that persons are literally alive and 
books are not weaken Rushdie' s argument? 
To consider this question shows that we 
have misunderstood Rushdie' s reasoning. 
Our interest in Rushdie' s reasoning pertains 
to his contention that the possible misuse 
of something by someone does not provide 
per se a reason for isolating it. 
When evaluating HC arguings we do not 
look at similarities or dissimilarities between 
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the base and the target. Rather, we ask 
whether the base clearly announces the con-
ditional, and whether the premises of the 
associated argument are true. 
1.3 Choosing an analysis. I am not say-
ing that all uses of analogy in reasoning are 
appropriately analyzed as HC analogical 
arguings. Though the analysis fits Examples 
Land R perhaps other uses of analogy are 
to be analyzed in other ways. Consider so-
called refutations by analogy. The refuter 
asserts that argument X (the base) is like 
argument Y (the target), that X is obvious-
ly invalid (since its premises are true and 
its conclusion is false), and expects us to 
conclude that Y is invalid. An HC analysis 
of the reasoning looks like this: 
1. (Analogy Step) The refuter thinks that 
argument X is like argument Y. 
2. (Analogy-to-Conditional Step) The 
refuter thinks that given the Analogy Step 
the audience will recognize that if Y is 
not invalid then it is possible for an argu-
ment with true premises and a false con-
clusion to be valid. 
3. (Inference Step) The refuter expects the 
audience to infer that Y is invalid, given 
the conditional in Step 2 and the denial 
of this conditional's consequent. 
I am not certain that the HC analysis of the 
refutation is the correct one. But it is an in-
teresting alternative to the standard textbook 
analysis of such refutations, which has been 
trenchantly criticized by Massey. See 
(Massey 1980, pp. 319-320) and the 
references at the end of his paper. 
Or consider this use of a literal analogy 
in reasoning: 'This apple is like that apple 
since they came from the same tree. This 
apple (the base) has a worm hole. So that 
apple (the target) has a worm hole.' It would 
be a mistake to give this reasoning any 
structure other than its superficial structure. 
In particular, I resist the HC analysis, ac-
cording to which the following argument 
is embedded in the reasoning: 
1. (Major Premise) If that apple does not 
have a worm hole no apples on the tree 
have worm holes. 
2. (Minor Premise) This apple on the tree 
has a worm hole. 
3. (Conclusion) That apple has a worm hole. 
I also resist giving the argument associated 
with the reasoning the following complex 
structure: 
1. This apple on the tree has a worm 
hole. 
So, 2. All apples on the tree have worm 
holes. (By induction) 
3. That apple is on the tree. 
So, 4. That apple on the tree has a worm 
hole. (By deduction, from 2 and 3) 
Russell correctly notes that if the reason-
ing is construed in this way it is weaker than 
it would be if the generalization step (step 
2) were bypassed. See (Russell 1959 p. 80) 
and also (W.E. Johnson 1964, vol. 3, p. 44). 
2. Analyses similar to the He analysis 
2.1 Levi's analysis. In (Levi 1948) we 
can find what we are calling the HC analysis 
of reasoning. Levi says: 
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is 
reasoning by example. It is reasoning from 
case to case. It is a three-step process 
described by the doctrine of precedent in 
which a proposition descriptive of the first 
case is made into a rule of law and then ap-
plied to a similar situation. The steps are 
these: similarity is seen between cases; next 
the rule of law inherent in the first case is 
announced; then the rule of law is made ap-
plicable to the second case. (pp. 1-2) 
Suppose, for example, judge j argues that 
plaintiff p should be compensated for 
damages. The analogical arguing of the 
judge is that p' s case is like q' s. The judge 
extracts a principle P (whenever x is in state 
y, x should be compensated for damages) 
from q's case (the base) and expects that 
his or her audience will recognize P in the 
base. So, the argument associated with j's 
analogical arguing on the HC analysis is: 
1. (Major premise) Ifp is not compen-
sated for damages, then principle 
P is violated. 
2. (Minor premise) Principle P should 
not be violated. 
So, 3. (Conclusion) p should be compen-
sated for damages. 
2.2 Aristotle's analysis. Levi traces his 
analysis of legal reasoning to Aristotle. 
We quote the passage Levi refers to, giving 
Ross's translation (Ross 1980, p. 487): 
It is an example when the major term is 
shown to belong to the middle term by 
means of a term like the middle term. We 
must know beforehand both that the middle 
term is true of the minor, and that the ma-
jor term is true of the term like the minor. 
Let A be evil, B aggressive war on 
neighbors, C that of Athens against Thebes, 
D that of Thebes against Phocis. If we want 
to show that C is A, we must first know that 
B is A; and this we learn from observing 
that e.g. D is A. Then we have the syllogism 
'B is A, C is B, Therefore C is A.' (Prior 
Analytics, 68b38-69a6) 
The He analysis of the reasoning in Aristo-
tle's example is as follows: 
1. (Analogy Step) The arguer asserts that 
a war by Athens on Thebes is like a war 
by Thebes on Phocis. 
2. (Analogy-to-Conditional Step) The author 
uses the Analogy Step to assert that if 
a war by Athens on Thebes is not evil 
then wars against neighbors are not evil. 
3. (Inference Step) The author expects his 
or her audience to infer that a war by 
Athens on Thebes is evil from the con-
ditional sentence in Step 2 together with 
the denial of the consequent of this con-
ditional: Wars against neighbors are evil. 
Aristotle's analysis of the reasoning is 
not exactly like the HC analysis. For him 
the associated argument has the form of Bar-
bara (All aggressive wars against neighbors 
are evil; all aggressive wars by Athens on 
Thebes are aggressive wars against 
neighbors; so all aggressive wars by Athens 
on Thebes are evil) instead of modus tollendo 
tollens. But the similarity of the analyses 
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is strong. Rather than taking the base at face 
value (as in a simple inductive analogical 
arguing) the base is related to the "rule" 
that all wars on neighbors are evil. 
But how is the base related to the rule 
(principle)? Well, the rule inheres in the 
base. But in what sense? The commentators 
do not agree about the interpretation of 
Aristotle's remarks. Smith says that the base 
establishes the rule. When commenting 
about the above passage he says: 
... to prove that war with the neighbouring 
Thebans would be evil for the Athenians ... 
we first offer a familiar example (the war 
of the Thebans with their neighbors the Pho-
cians was an evil for them) to establish the 
principle 'war with one's neighbors is an 
evil' and then apply this to the particular case 
at hand. (Smith 1989, p. 222, my italics) 
Ross would not agree with this use of 
'establish.' Ross says: 
Its real interest [the real interest of argument 
by example (analogy)] is not like that of 
science, in generalization, but in inducing 
a particular belief, e.g. that a particular ag-
gressive war will be dangerous to the coun-
try that wages it. (Ross 1980, p. 488) 
Ross is right. Ross believes that the base 
does not establish the principle; rather, the 
base is used to get the audience to recognize 
the principle. The principle inheres in the 
base in the way in which the Pythagorean 
Theorem inheres in a particular triangle. 
The triangle does not give evidence for the 
theorem, but one can get the belief that the 
theorem is true by observing the triangle. 
For another example of inherence con-
sider the following non-analogical arguing: 
I was so surprised to see your definition of 
Halloween as 'All Hallows Evening.' .. .It 
therefore follows that Christmas Eve is the 
evening of Dec. 25. (Virginia Owens, 
quoted in William Saffire's You Could Look 
It Up, New York: Henry Holt, 1988, p. 103) 
That Virginia Owens was surprised is not 
a part of the argument associated with this 
arguing. From her comments about herself 
we recognize that she is asserting that it is 
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a mistake to say that Halloween is the even-
ing of All Saints' Day (All Hallows' Day, 
November 1). Given the notion of inherence 
under discussion, we can say that her imper-
sonal remark inheres in her personal remark. 
It is surprising that Aristotle's general 
characterization of argument by analogy 
(example) seems to be restricted to literal 
analogies. For, it is common for arguers to 
use figurative analogies to elicit principles 
that inhere in the base of the analogy. 
Aristotle says: 
Example, then, is inference from part to 
part, when both fall under the same class 
and one is well known. Induction reasons 
from all the particulars and does not apply 
the conclusion to a new particular; exam-
ple does so apply it and does not reason from 
all particulars. (Ross 1980, p. 488, my italics.) 
Consider Rushdie's "inference from 
part to part" in which one of the parts (in-
nocent persons) is "well known." Do the 
parts fall in the same class? The natural 
answer is no. One part is in the class of 
human beings and the other is not. But 
perhaps what Aristotle means by saying the 
parts belong to the same class is that the 
principle elicited by the one of the parts (the 
base) applies to both parts. If this is what 
he means then it is true that the base and 
the target in an HC arguing belong to the 
same class. 
3. More examples of He arguings 
Example M 
One does not need to search for pathology 
to explain career choice any more than one 
needs underlying scatological or sexual ex-
planations to understand every innocuous bit 
of behavior. Altruistic people, who work hard 
to help others, should not be suspected ipso 
facto of harboring ulterior selfish motives. 
(Thomas Maeder, "Wounded Healers," 
The Atlantic Monthly, Jan., 1989, p. 37) 
The H C arguing is: 
1. (Analogy Step) Maeder thinks that the 
reasons people make career choices (the 
target) are like the reasons people do "in-
nocuous things," choose blue over beige 
cars, choose to put kiwis instead of cher-
ries on their cheesecake, etc. (the base). 
2. (Analogy-to-Conditional Step) Maeder 
uses Step 1 to get us to recognize that 
if people who make career choices 
should be suspected ipso facto of harboring 
ulterior selfish motives then the reasons 
for "ordinary" choices are tainted. 
3. (Inference Step) Maeder expects us to in-
fer that the denial of the antecedent of 
the conditional in Step 2 follows from 
this conditional together with the denial 
of its antecedent. 
Example A 
Legislation to outlaw liquor in the '20s 
didn't work, and attempts to ban drugs ob-
viously haven't been effective. Time's pro-
posals would create an even bigger black 
market and make a criminal of the average 
citizen. Thank God for the National Rifle 
Association. (John Armanini, Time. Feb. 
27, 1989, 'Letters to the Editor. ') 
This example is Armanini' s complete 
letter, short, but interesting. Note that the 
conclusion and the base for the analogy are 
implicit. And note that Armanini is argu-
ing both analogically and non-analogically. 
The second sentence is not a part of the 
analogical arguing indicated by the first. 
And note that the final conclusion, that guns 
should not be banned, is implicit and is 
derived from the implicit, mediating con-
clusion, that those who try to ban guns will 
not succeed. We give an HC-analysis of the 
analogical arguing: 
1. (Analogy Step) Armanini thinks that the 
banning of guns (the target) is like the 
banning of liquor and drugs (the base). 
2. (Analogy-to-Conditional Step) Armanini 
expects the audience to recognize that if 
the banning of guns will be successful 
then in general a society will succeed in 
abolishing the use of x by legislation. 
3. (Inference Step) Armanini expects us to 
infer the denial of the antecedent of the 
conditional in Step 2 from this conditional 
together with the denial of its consequent. 
4. HC explainings 
Given the similarity of arguings and ex-
plainings, we can expect that the HC 
analysis will be suitable for at least some 
explainings. And it is. We turn to this topic 
not only to say something about explainings, 
which are typically slighted in the text-
books, but to improve our fix on the HC 
analysis of arguings. 
By an explaining we mean an activity 
in which the author is using claims to help 
the audience understand a claim whose truth 
the author thinks the audience accepts. An 
analogical explaining is an activity in which 
an analogy is an essential ingredient in the 
explaining. With any explaining there is 
an associated explanation, though the 
relationship between the explaining and 
the associated explanation may not be 
direct. 
Example P 
Only Ireland has no divorce law at all, a pro-
posed bill having recently been defeated in 
a referendum by a combination of the 
Roman Catholic Church and fearful Irish 
women. During the referendum, an oppo-
nent observed that "a woman who votes in 
favor of divorce is like a turkey voting in 
favor of Christmas." (Roderick Phillips, 
New York Review of Books, March 2, 
1989, p. 12) 
It seems to me that anyone who evaluated 
this explanation by discussing the 
similarities between women and turkeys 
would be misunderstanding the role of the 
analogy in the explaining. This is an HC 
analysis of the explaining: 
1. (Analogy Step) Phillips asserts that a 
turkey's desire that humans celebrate 
Christmas in the traditional way (the 
base) is like an Irish woman's desire that 
divorce be legalized. 
2. (Analogy-to-Conditional Step) Phillips 
expects us to recognize this conditional, 
given the Analogy Step: If Irish women 
had voted for legalizing divorce they 
would have wanted to bring about their 
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own demise. 
3. (Explanation Step) Phillips expects the 
audience to use the conditional in Step 
2 to generate the following explanation: 
Explanans: 
Explanans: 
Conditional in Step 2. 
Irish women did not 
want to bring about their 
own demise. 
Explanandum: Irish women did not vote 
for legalizing divorce. 
Example S 
What can make cities work again, runs the 
cheerfully contrarian thesis of urban re-
searcher William H. Whyte is not less con-
gestion but more. Not monorails, fortress 
office towers and sanitized fouth-floor 
skyways between buildings, but hot-dog 
carts, jostling sidewalk crowds, street musi-
cians, handbill passers, eccentrics, arm-
waving conversationalists, three card monte 
scamsters and girl-watching construction 
workers. Winos snoozing. Bag ladies mut-
tering. ... The reader takes in this sedition 
with a widening grin, as if a doctor were 
telling him to layoff oat bran, a dangerous 
spiritual depressant, and start packing in but-
ter fried-eggs and thick steaks. (John Skow, 
Time, Feb. 27, 1989, p. 78) 
Of course, Skow is not trying to prove 
that anyone who hears Whyte's advice will 
be skeptical. He is sure that Whyte's 
audience will be skeptical. The explanation 
embedded in the HC explaining can be 
arranged as follows: 
Explanans: If people did not react 
skeptically to Whyte's 
beliefs then people 
would not react skep-
tically to beliefs that 
are contrary to the so-
ciety'S well-entrenched 
beliefs. 
Explanans: People react skeptically 
to beliefs that are con-
trary to the society's 
well-entrenched beliefs. 
Explanadum: People react skeptically 
to Whyte's beliefs. 
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Example N 
We think the surface of the earth is like a 
coffee percolator. As in a coffee percolator, 
the input of heat is essentially continuous. 
Because of poor conduction through the con-
tinents, however, the heat is released in 
relatively sudden bursts. (R. Damian Nance, 
et al., Scientific American. July, 1988, p. 72) 
This is an HC analysis of the passage: 
1. (Analogy Step) Nance asserts that the 
eruptions of a coffee percolator (the base) 
are like the eruptions of the earth's sur-
face (the target). 
2. (Analogy-to-Conditional Step) Nance ex-
pects the audience to draw a conditional 
of the following form from the Analogy 
Step: If the earth did not erupt in the 
manner in which it does then we would 
have to deny that whenever x is heated 
and has characteristics C then x will 
behave in way w. 
3. (Explanation Step) Nance uses the con-
ditional in Step 2 together with the im-
plicit explanans that the earth is heated 
and has characteristics C to explain the 
eruptions at the earth's surface. 
From the passage cited we cannot be 
sure which characteristics, C, Nance has in 
mind. But we can be confident that to com-
plete his reasoning we need to determine 
what these characteristics are. And we can 
be confident that anyone who criticizes the 
reasoning by finding dissimilarities between 
coffee percolators and the earth's surface 
is on the wrong track. 
5. Summary 
For many, though not all, uses of 
analogies in arguings and explainings, the 
HC analysis is better than the induction 
analysis. The HC analysis cuts across the 
literal/figurative distinction-Aristotle's 
analogy is literal and Rushdie' s (Example 
R) is figurative. The roots of the HC 
analysis are in the Prior Analytics. When 
analyzing uses of analogy in reasoning, 
we should at least consider the HC analysis 
and thus look for the conditional sentence 
inherent in the analogy. If the HC analysis is 
the correct one to choose, then the associated 
argument has a simple deductive structure. 
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